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This paper investigates the reasons why contracting authorities are discouraged from lodging 
actions for damages against tenderers engaged in bid rigging and other collusive practices and 
whether the new EU Damages Directive has managed to overcome these problems and bring 
advantages over the longstanding damages claims based on tort law. It will be suggested that 
the steps that the new EU Damages Directive has taken are not adequate to boost the number 
of actions for damages initiated by public contracting authorities. The paper therefore makes a 
number of recommendations and explores whether there are alternative remedies to the standard 
tort law litigation, which would enable contracting authorities to access compensation more 
easily.  
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1 Introduction 
The value of goods and services procured by public authorities in 2015 was worth 127.56 billion 
Euros in the United Kingdom alone.1 These contracts are awarded through a tendering process 
that is meant to be competitive. Competition forces tenderers to keep their prices low, thereby 
saving money for the taxpayer. Anti-competitive agreements between tenderers such as bid 
rigging allow them to act as a monopolist, artificially raising prices that are ultimately paid by 
consumers (in this case taxpayers) and thus placing an unnecessary burden on public finances. 
The ability of local authorities and government departments to bring private actions for 
damages for a breach of competition law allows some of this public money to be recovered and 
deters other tenderers from engaging in similar practices. Before the recent competition law 
Damages Directive 2014/104/EC2 (hereinafter the “new Damages Directive”), contracting 
authorities were not in a particularly good position to seek damages for bid rigging.  
 
This paper critically analyses whether the new Damages Directive has made it easier for 
authorities to successfully recover damages for being overcharged and, if this is not the case, 
what recommendations can be made and what alternative compensatory remedies are 
potentially available. This question has largely been unexplored to date because academics have 
focused on the other side of the coin, namely the damages awarded by the authorities to private 
bidders for violating public procurement procedures and fundamental principles of equal 
treatment.3 It is also an issue of great importance given the value of procurement contracts 
                                                          
*Penelope-Alexia Giosa is a PhD candidate in Public Procurement and Competition Law at the University of East 
Anglia (UEA) and at the Centre for Competition Policy (CCP). She holds an LLM from University College London 
(UCL) and an LLM from UEA. She is a qualified lawyer in Greece and Cyprus and before joining UEA in 2015, she 
was practicing Administrative law in Cyprus. Email: P.Giosa@uea.ac.uk. 
1 Commission, Public Procurement Indicators 2015, DG GROW G4- Innovative and e-Procurement, December 19, 
2016. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/20679 (accessed 10 February 2018). 
2 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union [2014] OJ L349/1. 
3 S. Arrowsmith, Remedies for Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules (Winteringham: Earlsgate, 1993); S. 
Treumer and F. Lichère, Enforcement of the EU public procurement rules (København, Djøf Publishing, 2011); D. 
Fairgrieve and F. Lichère, Public Procurement Law: Damages as an Effective Remedy (Oxford Hart, 2011); H. 
Schebesta, Damages in EU Public Procurement Law (Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016), p. 21. 
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across Europe4 and the potential cost to taxpayers resulting from bid-rigging behavior.5 The 
significance of this issue is even more apparent if someone takes into account the fact that bid 
rigging leads to higher artificial prices than other anticompetitive activities, such as price fixing 
and market sharing.6 Bid rigging is a practice whereby firms agree to cooperate over their 
response to invitations to tender, while price fixing and market sharing are horizontal 
agreements between independent undertakings to fix prices and divide markets accordingly, in 
order to suppress price competition and perpetuate the isolation of geographical markets.7 In a 
time of economic crisis in which attempts are made to reduce public expenditure in any possible 
way, the promotion of private enforcement of EU competition law by public authorities in the 
EU Member States may secure budget savings.8  
Moreover, any shortcomings in the enforcement of articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) not only hinder the achievement of competition 
goals, such as better allocation of resources, greater economic efficiency, increased innovation 
and lower prices, but also negatively influences the functioning of the internal market, which 
                                                          
4 According to public procurement indicators, the estimated value of tenders published in Tenders Electronic 
Daily (“TED”) (including utilities and defence) was 450.21 billion Euros in 2015. Additionally, every year over 
250,000 public authorities in the EU spend around 14 per cent of European GDP on public contracts for the 
purchase of services, works and suppliers. See Commission, Public Procurement Indicators 2015, 2016; See also 
Commission, Public Procurement, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-
procurement_en (accessed 10 February 2018). 
5 It is estimated that the annual direct cost to consumers and other victims of hardcore cartels in the EU, including 
bidding rings, ranges from approximately 13 billion Euros (on the most conservative assumptions) to over 37 
billion Euros (on the least conservative). Due to bid rigging, the prices are artificially raised between 6 and 48 per 
cent above the competitive level, while the prices in a supply chain can be raised by more than 30 per cent 
without this increase being concomitant with a respective restriction of output. See Commission, Staff Working 
Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2008) 165 
final, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008SC0404&from=EN 
(accessed 21 February 2018); J.B. Baker The Case for Antitrust Enforcement (2003) 17 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, pp. 27, 29; Competition and Markets Authority Local Authorities and Competition, available at: 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/669668/local_authorities_and_com
petition_final_report.pdf (accessed 27 Dec. 2017), p. 10; I. Apostolakis, Antitrust Liability in Cases of Indirect 
Contacts between Competitors: VM Remonts, (2017) 54  CMLR, 609. 
6 S. Davies and A. Majumdar, The Development of Targets For Consumer Savings Arising from Competition Policy- 
Report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading (OFT)  June 2002, available at: 
file:///C:/Users/Penelope/Downloads/The_development_of_targets_for_consumer_savings_a%20(3).pdf 
(accessed 17 May 2018), p. 3; See also M. Maci, Bid Rigging in the EU Public-Procurement Markets: Some History 
and Developments, (2011) 32 ECLR, 406. 
7 R. Whish and D. Bailey, Competition Law (Oxford University Press, 7th edn, 2012), pp. 524, 530-531, 536-537. 
8 M. Botta, Commission acting as plaintiff in cases of private enforcement of EU competition law: Otis, (2013) 50 
CMLR, 1115. 
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relies on a system of undistorted competition.9  In addition to these reasons, this topic is closely 
related to bid rigging cartel behaviour, a very deliberate breach of the law that involves 
overpaying taxpayers’ funds - money that could otherwise be invested in public services, for 
example. Bid rigging constitutes a criminal offence in Germany and other countries.10 
Indicatively, in Germany the official statistics of the Federal Statistics Office report 297 
convictions and 42 suspended prison sentences for bid rigging from 1998 to 2013, whilst the 
French Competition Authority issued more than 220 decisions for collusion cases in public 
procurement resulting in more than 750 different firms being fined.11 In England, 109 
construction firms were found to be engaged in bid rigging activities in 199 tenders from 2000 
to 2006.12 Similarly, in Sweden, some of the biggest construction companies in the country, 
such as NCC, Skanska and PEAB were found guilty of forming a cartel that ‘enriched itself at 
the expense of customers, taxpayers and consumers’.13 Bidding rings were also detected in 
various other markets, such as the market of installation and maintenance of elevators and 
escalators14 as well as the market for heating pipes.15 
The likely scale of the problem that EU Member States face when it comes to bid rigging 
renders necessary research on the entitlement of procurement authorities to damages in case of 
collusive tendering. This is so because it is believed that private enforcement may be not only 
a deterrent against this anticompetitive conduct but also a means of restorative justice that can 
restore taxpayers’ money.16 This function of damages claims for bid rigging is  apparent in 
                                                          
9 Commission, Impact Assessment Report- Damages Actions for Breach of the EU Antitrust Rules, COM (2013) 404 
final, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/impact_assessment_en.pdf 
(accessed 13 February 2018), 18. 
10 Austria is one of these countries. See W. P.J. Wils, Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer? (2005) 
28 World Competition, 130. 
11 F. Wagner-von Papp, Compliance and Individual Sanctions in the Enforcement of Competition Law in Paha (ed), 
Competition Law Compliance Programs-An Interdisciplinary Approach (Springer, 2016), 155; J. Moore, Cartels 
Facing Competition in Public Procurement: An Empirical Analysis, September 2012, available at: http://chaire-
eppp.org/files_chaire/moore_2013_-_cartels_facing_competition.pdf (accessed 10 February 2018). 
12 OFT, Bid Rigging in the Construction Industry in England, available at: 
www.webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402190711/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leafl
ets/general/CE4327-04_Decision__public_1.pdf (accessed 27 December 2017).  
13 Swedish Competition Authority, Construction Companies Convicted of Operating an Asphalt Cartel,  available 
at: www.konkurrensverket.se/en/news/construction-companies-convicted-of-operating-a-asphalt-cartel/ 
(accessed 24 October 2017). 
14 Kone AG v OBB-Infrastructur AG (C-557/12) [2014] EU:C:2014:1317 ; [2014] 5 C.M.L.R. 5. 
15 LR AF 1998 A/S (formerly Logstor Ror A/S) v Commission of the European Communities (T-23/99) [2002] E.C.R. 
II-1705; 5 C.M.L.R. 10.  
16 A. Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by National 
Courts (Hart Publishing 2008), 19; A. Komninos The Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement: quod 
Dei Deo, quod Caesaris Caesari in Philip Lowe and Mel Marquis (eds) European Competition Law Annual 2011: 
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countries like Japan, where the deterrent effect of private enforcement is significant, as “activist 
plaintiffs obtain substantial recoveries on behalf of local governments and public entities 
frequently seek and obtain damages”.17 By contrast, in Europe damages claims for bid rigging 
do not yet play a crucial role in deterring anticompetitive activities,18 but this does not mean 
that things may not change for the better.19  
In an attempt to improve the European private damages landscape i.e. through the new Damages 
Directive, this paper will firstly discuss the problems that contracting authorities usually face 
when seeking damages for bid rigging from colluding undertakings, such as proof of the loss 
suffered and its amount. Secondly, it will examine whether the new Damages Directive can 
overcome some or all of these issues and whether it brings any advantages over the longstanding 
damages claims based on tort law. As we will see after analysing the shortcomings of the new 
Damages Directive and the challenges arising under it relating to the incentives and practical 
obstacles to bringing an action, there has not been much improvement in the legal reparation of 
contracting authorities as private litigants since its enactment. For this reason, this paper asks 
whether any recommendations can be made to address this problem and whether there can be 
any alternative compensatory remedies for contracting authorities.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section two explains the reasons why contracting authorities 
are reluctant to pursue an action against businesses engaged in bid-rigging practices in public 
procurement. These reasons are specific to bid rigging and they differ from the general obstacles 
to effective compensation identified in the Green and White Paper on damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules. The new Damages Directive is briefly outlined to better 
understand the obstacles faced by contracting authorities’ in seeking effective compensation. 
Section three examines the question of whether the ability to make claims for damages in case 
of bid rigging under the new Damages Directive is worthwhile and practicable, taking into 
account the fact that this ability already existed in most EU Member States under the national 
tort laws. This will be done by outlining and analysing the challenges that arise under the new 
Directive regarding private enforcement by procurement entities. In section four, 
recommendations are made in order to deal with some of the hurdles that contracting authorities 
face when seeking damages for bid rigging, since the new Damages Directive failed to address 
them properly. In section five, there is a discussion of whether a remedy which is not based on 
                                                          
Integrating Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law: Implications for Courts and Agencies (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2014), 142. 
17 S. Vande Walle, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in Japan: An Empirical Analysis, (2011) 8 CompLRev, 8  
18 Commission, Impact Assessment Report- Damages Actions for Breach of the EU Antitrust Rules, 2013; OECD 
Secretariat, Relationship Between Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement, available at: 
www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WP3(2015)14&docLanguage=
En (accessed 24 Oct. 2017); B.J. Rodger, Competition Law Litigation in the UK Courts: A Study of All Cases 2005-
2008- Part I, (2009)2 GCLR pp.95, 104. 
19 M. P. Schinkel, Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe, (2007) 30 World Competition, 556-557. 
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tortious liability but on contractual principles could also help contracting authorities to 
overcome the challenges under the new Damages Directive regarding their right to claim 
damages for bid rigging. The cause of action at issue is based on the experience gained in 
Germany and the United Kingdom. The last section draws together the main conclusions. 
2 Why Contracting Authorities Do Not Sue Cartels For Damages 
Before analysing the reasons why actions by public authorities to recover damages for bid 
rigging are infrequent in the EU, it is necessary to briefly present the legislative background of 
the new Damages Directive and refer to the main issues that were identified by the Green and 
White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules as obstacles to private 
enforcement.  
On 19 December 2005, the Commission adopted the Green Paper which indentified the main 
obstacles to effective compensation.20 The response to this public consultation was wide and 
involved several institutional stakeholders.21 As a result, a Report and a Resolution were 
adopted by the European Parliament in 2007, which invited the Commission to proceed to a 
White Paper that would make detailed proposals to facilitate actions for damages.22 On 2 April 
2008, the White Paper23 was published including suggestions for specific measures that would 
ensure the effective exercise of the right to compensation for antitrust harm.24 The White Paper 
was accompanied by an Impact Assessment. In these documents, the major difficulties that 
victims of competition law infringements usually experience when asking for compensation 
were identified. Some of them were:  
 
“The difficult access to the evidence that is necessary for proving a case, lack of 
clear rules on the passing-on defence (i.e. a defence against a direct purchaser’s 
damages claim, relying on evidence showing that the overcharge resulting from a 
cartel was passed on-fully or partially- by the direct purchaser to its own customers 
further down the distribution chain), the calculation of damages and the rules 
concerning the costs of a damages action”.25  
                                                          
20 Commission, Green Paper- Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules COM (2005)672 final, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0672&from=EN (accessed 21 
February 2018). The Green Paper was prepared by a 2004 study on the conditions under which private parties 
can bring actions for antitrust damages. 
21 Commission, Impact Assessment Report- Damages Actions for Breach of the EU Antitrust Rules, 2013, p. 6. 
22 Commission, Impact Assessment Report- Damages Actions for Breach of the EU Antitrust Rules, 2013, p. 6. 
23 Commission, White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008)165 final, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/impact_assessment_en.pdf (accessed 21 February 
2018). 
24 Commission, Impact Assessment Report- Damages Actions for Breach of the EU Antitrust Rules, 2013, p. 6. 
25 Commission, Impact Assessment Report- Damages Actions for Breach of the EU Antitrust Rules, 2013, p. 15; 
Commission, White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules, 2008, para. 2; M.P. Schinkel, 
Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe, 2007 (30) World Competition: Law and Economics Review, pp. 557-558. 
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The Directive sought to overcome these issues by introducing a number of key provisions. For 
instance, regarding access to evidence, it contemplated that courts should ensure enhanced but 
proportionate access to evidence held by plaintiffs, defendants and third parties, including 
antitrust agencies, subject to two important limitations.26 The first one concerns the prohibition 
of disclosure of corporate statements submitted to the Commission under the EU’s amnesty 
regime (i.e. its leniency programme) and the second concerns the ban on the disclosure of 
settlement submissions under the EU’s settlement procedure.27 Regarding the passing-on 
defence, i.e. the defence against a claim for damages that the claimant passed on the whole or 
part of the overcharge resulting from the infringement of competition law, the new Damages 
Directive made it available in response to claims by either direct or indirect purchaser claims.28 
Direct purchaser means a natural or legal person who acquired, directly from an infringer, 
products or services that were the object of an infringement of competition law.29 Indirect 
purchaser means a natural or legal person who acquired, not directly from an infringer, but from 
a direct purchaser or a subsequent purchaser, products or services that were the object of an 
infringement of competition law, or products or services containing them or derived 
therefrom.30 In case of direct purchaser claims, the burden of proof is on the defendant who 
must prove that every overcharge was passed on by the plaintiffs to their own customers.31 The 
new Damages Directive also created a rebuttable presumption as to the existence of harm 
resulting from a cartel but it did not introduce any presumption as to any particular overcharge 
percentage.32 Furthermore, it provided for joint and several liability of defendants in cartel 
cases, except where the infringer is a successful immunity recipient and a small or medium-
sized enterprise (SME).33   
After briefly highlighting the measures introduced by the new Damages Directive with the aim 
of increasing civil antitrust claims, we turn now to the reasons why the level of private 
enforcement among contracting authorities is low in relation to bid rigging. Firstly, the 
entitlement of contracting authorities to damages under competition law can generate costs in 
terms of resources involved in litigation and time, which will ultimately be borne by the public 
                                                          
26 Art. 6, Directive 2014/104; M. Sansom, A. Morfey and P. Teague, Recent Developments in Private Antitrust 
Damages Litigation in Europe, (2015)29 Antitrust pp. 33, 36-37.  
27 Commission, White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules, 2008, para. 6; M. Sansom, 
A. Morfey and P. Teague, Recent Developments in Private Antitrust Damages Litigation in Europe, (2015)29 
Antitrust , p. 37. 
28 Art. 13, Directive 2014/104; ; M. Sansom, A. Morfey and P. Teague, Recent Developments in Private Antitrust 
Damages Litigation in Europe, (2015)29 Antitrust, p. 37. 
29 Art. 2, para (23), Directive 2014/104.  
30 Art. 2, para (24), Directive 2014/104. 
31 Art. 13, Directive 2014/104.  
32 Art. 17, Directive 2014/104; ; M. Sansom, A. Morfey and P. Teague, Recent Developments in Private Antitrust 
Damages Litigation in Europe, (2015)29 Antitrust , p. 37. 
33 Art. 11, Directive 2014/104.  
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budget to the detriment of taxpayers. This is particularly true in EU Member States where there 
are many and small procurement agencies (‘high fragmentation of public sector’), that lack or 
do not allocate efficiently enforcement resources. The ‘loser pays’ cost rule that governs the 
national tort systems in Europe makes a claim for damages very expensive and risky for 
contracting authorities that manage and use the taxpayers’ money, i.e. the state budget. 
Whereas private actors usually have a strong motivation and industry-specific knowledge to 
monitor and detect anti-competitive behaviour,34 public officers may have difficulty in 
identifying and comprehending the length and nature of deviations from the initial quantity 
ordered and contracted by the State. This is so because bid rigging is tricky to detect, whilst the 
public procurement community is not always equipped with tools to prevent, detect and deter 
bid rigging, as successfully happens in the UK for instance, where the Competition Market 
Authority (CMA) has developed tools and advice to help purchasers within the public sector 
identify suspicious behaviour by suppliers when bidding for contracts.35  Public officers are 
also under constant pressure to ensure maximum value for tax-payers’ money, while each time 
they evaluate the tenders in order to choose the winning tender, they have to take numerous 
considerations -legal, environmental and social- into account. This means that sometimes they 
may pay little attention to whether bidding rings exist or not, without constantly monitoring 
bidding activities and without performing analyses on bid data in order to collect historical 
information on bidding behaviour. This makes sense if it is also considered that public officers 
are generally not evaluated on the number of bidding rings discovered but on what extent they 
set up and ran the bidding processes successfully and covered the public needs without delays.36    
In addition to the above, when it comes to bid rigging, there are many EU Member States, such 
as Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary and Romania which, as a matter of policy, promote 
more individual sanctions, like criminal penalties37 as opposed to sanctions operating at the 
corporate level, like civil damages claims. 38Another reason could be that only a few cases have 
                                                          
34 R. Preston McAfee, H.M. Mialon and S.H. Mialon, Private v. Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Strategic Analysis 
(2008) 92 Journal of Public Economics, pp. 1866-1867; Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Private 
Actions in Competition Law: A Consultation on Options for Reform-Government Response, January 2013, available 
at: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/70185/13-501-private-actions-in-
competition-law-a-consultation-on-options-for-reform-government-response1.pdf (accessed 6 July 2016), 8,11; 
A. Renda, J. Peysner, A.J. Riley, B.J. Rodger, Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU: Welfare 
Impact and Potential Scenarios- Final Report, available at: 
www.ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf (accessed 28 
October 2017), p. 18.  
35 The CMA Screening for Cartels tool is freely available for procurement professionals to download and use. It is 
a software that uses algorithms to spot unusual bidder behaviour and pricing patterns which may indicate that 
bid rigging has taken place. For further information see www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-launches-digital-
tool-to-fight-bid-rigging (accessed 13 July 2018).  
36 Alberto Heimler, Cartels in Public Procurement, (2012)8(4) Journal of Competition Law & Economics, p. 861. 
37 F. Wagner-von Papp, Compliance and Individual Sanctions in the Enforcement of Competition Law, in Paha (ed), 
Competition Law Compliance Programs-An Interdisciplinary Approach (Springer, 2016), fn. 20 
38 
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recently been brought by public contracting authorities in the courts of Member States for 
damages resulting from bid rigging, giving a false impression that bid rigging is less of a 
problem in the EU.39 According to a 2007 Study, the antitrust infringement that is most 
frequently challenged through private litigation in the EU is vertical restraints 40, and only 
twelve cases out of ninety six involved hardcore cartels, including bid rigging schemes.41 
Nevertheless, in Netherlands after the revelation of bidding rings in the construction sector, the 
government reached a global settlement with the construction industry, recovering 70 million 
Euros in damages for bid rigging.42  
One of the few cases brought for damages resulting from bid rigging in the EU is European 
Commission v. Otis NV, which preceded the new Damages Directive.43 In this case, the 
European Union represented by the Commission, asked for damages for the higher price it 
allegedly paid for the maintenance of elevators in European institution buildings in Belgium 
and Luxembourg, as a result of the anti-competitive practices established in the decision of 21 
February 2007. According to the Commission’s decision in 2007, the elevator manufacturers 
were found guilty of infringement of article 101 TFEU from 1996 to 2004, as they were 
involved in market sharing and bid rigging with regard to the installation and maintenance of 
elevators and escalators in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Shortly 
thereafter, the Commission fined the relevant elevator manufacturers Euro 992 million.  
Despite this decision, the Court dismissed the Commission’s claim for damages in respect of 
the harm caused by the elevators and escalators cartels. Since the new Directive was not 
applicable when the action for damages was lodged and so the rebuttable presumption under 
Art 17, para. 2 did not yet apply, it was held that the Commission did not submit direct evidence 
or oral evidence of witnesses that could determine or estimate the damages caused by the cartel 
arrangements.44 In other words, before the enactment of the new Damages Directive, it could 
not be assumed that practices such as bid rigging automatically led to higher prices.  
                                                          
39 S. Vande Walle, Private Antitrust Litigation in the European Union and Japan: A Comparative Perspective (Maklu 
Publishers 2013), 227.  
40 Vertical restraints are agreements or concerted practices between two or more undertakings operating at a 
different  level of the production or distribution chain, that may affect trade between Member States and that 
prevent, restrict or distort competition. For further information please see Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ 
C 130.  
41 A. Renda, J. Peysner, A.J. Riley, B.J. Rodger, Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU: 
Welfare Impact and Potential Scenarios- Final Report, available at: 
www.ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf (accessed 28 
October 2017), p. 40.  
42 S. Vande Walle, Private Antitrust Litigation in the European Union and Japan: A Comparative Perspective, 
(Maklu Publishers 2013), p. 232. 
43 European Commission v Otis NV (C-199/11) [2013] EU:C:2012 :684 ; 4 [2013] C.M.L.R. 4.  
44 J. Ramos and D. Muhume, The Brussels Court judgement in Commission v Elevators manufacturers, or the story 
of how the Commission lost an action for damages based on its own infringement decision, (2015) 36 ECLR, p. 
386.  
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As already highlighted above, the introduction of the new Damages Directive has arguably not 
improved the position. The fact that cartels are presumed to cause harm does not mean that the 
(exact amount of the) cartel overcharge is automatically proved nor the loss suffered by the 
claimant. The financial harm still needs to be specified and quantified and currently the burden 
of proof is on the claimant. This is an additional reason why contracting authorities are not 
particularly well-placed to pursue an action for damages against cartels.  
 
3 Evaluation of the New Directive’s Effectiveness in Fostering Actions for Damages  
As indicated, there were a number of reasons why the level of private enforcement for bid-
rigging has been historically low. With the aim of improving the position of government 
procurement authorities as private litigants in competition cases, paragraph (3) in the Preamble 
of the new Damages Directive was introduced. According to the Preamble, in addition to 
consumers and undertakings, public authorities (and so procurement entities) can also claim 
compensation before national courts for the harm caused to them by an infringement of articles 
101 and 102 TFEU. This right already existed in most EU Member States and so the new 
Damages Directive expressly confirms that articles 101 and 102 TFEU create obligations and 
rights for contracting authorities that national courts must enforce. Competition damages for 
bid rigging in public procurement will enable contracting authorities to get compensated for 
losses unjustly suffered. Under the legal regime of the new Damages Directive, a pivotal 
question arises as to whether the new Damages Directive is effective for the legal reparation of 
contracting authorities as private litigants, and whether this will bring any advantages over the 
longstanding damages claims based on tort law. In order to answer this question, there is need 
to take into account the shortcomings and challenges arising under the Directive. 
Firstly, the new Damages Directive does not provide for specific aspects of antitrust litigation, 
such as legal costs and cost shifting (loser pays), which are determinant factors of whether the 
harmed contracting authorities will commence a legal action or not,45 as procurement entities 
manage and spend public money and so it is the citizens that will eventually bear any financial 
loss and litigation cost by contributing to the state budget as taxpayers. 46 For contracting 
authorities in their capacity as claimants, the size and predictability of litigation costs can 
determine whether they will access justice or not because if the costs are too high, there may 
be no benefit for them to pursue a legal action.47 In almost all countries, cost shifting (loser 
pays) is the general rule, apart from Lithuania and the United States of America, where each 
                                                          
45 M. De Sousa e Alvim, The new Directive on antitrust damages-a giant step forward? (2015) 36 ECLR, p. 247; S. 
Peyer, Compensation and the Damages Directive (2016) 12 ECJ, pp. 87-112; S. Peyer, The Antitrust Damages 
Directive – Much Ado About Nothing? in Cisotta and Marquis (eds), Litigation and Arbitration in EU Competition 
Law (Edward Elgar 2015). 
46 M. Maci, Private Enforcement in Bid Rigging Cases in the European Union, (2012) 8 (I) ECJ, p. 216. 
47 C.Hodges, S. Vogenauer and M. Tulibacka, The Oxford Study on Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation-
Introduction in Hodges, Vogenauer and Tulibacka (eds), The Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation: A Comparative 
Perspective (Bloomsbury Publishing 2010), p.4. 
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party undertakes its own costs.48 By not following the example of Lithuania and USA, the new 
Damages Directive has lost the chance to overcome the funding barriers that claimants usually 
face when it comes to bring damages for anti-competitive practices, depending in this way on 
the discretionary power of each court to award or not reasonable costs instead of full legal costs. 
It was suggested that such important elements of the private enforcement of competition law 
were left out of the Directive’s scope on purpose; otherwise the new Damages Directive would 
not be accepted. The loser pays rule is too engrained in European legal tradition.49 
Secondly, the new Damages Directive has not dealt with the key procedural hurdles that a 
contracting authority may face when bringing a damages claim for bid rigging, such as the 
evidence of a causal link and the quantification of the financial harm suffered by contracting 
authorities as a result of overcharged products or services in the context of the public 
procurement procedure. The Directive has been “reticent to engage in an extensive 
harmonization of the causation requirement”, by insisting on reliance on the various tort law 
systems of EU Member States, under the framework of the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness.50 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has also not clarified the issue.51 Though 
the new Damages Directive proceeded to include a number of provisions that make the evidence 
of a causal link much easier, practically speaking, these steps are not adequate to boost the 
number of damage actions initiated by public contracting authorities. Despite the explicit rule 
of joint and several liability in article 11, nothing is really gained by this rule. When it comes 
to bid rigging, it is much harder in terms of evidence to establish which undertakings were 
participants in the bidding ring and which undertakings were outsiders. This is so because there 
is not any typical illegal behaviour that would enable a simple establishment of who is in the 
bidding ring and who is not, as may happen in normal cartels, where one of the ways to 
determine cartel membership is to look at the level of output that a firm produces before and 
after the alleged cartel formation. Moreover, the lack of familiarity of procurement officers with 
bidding patterns related to bid rigging make it even harder for them to assess whether or not a 
specific tender presents a bid pattern that raises concerns and constitutes prima facie evidence 
of bid rigging that needs formal antitrust investigation.52  So, the extra difficulty of identifying 
the members of the bidding ring as well as the fact that procurement agencies lack skills and 
experience necessary to identify prima facie evidence of bid rigging and to apply the economic 
                                                          
48 C. Hodges, S. Vogenauer and M. Tulibacka, The Oxford Study on Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation- National 
Approaches to Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation, in Hodges, Vogenauer and Tulibacka (eds), The Costs and 
Funding of Civil Litigation: A Comparative Perspective (Bloomsbury Publishing 2010), p. 17. 
49 Editorial Comments, One bird in the hand…The Directive on Damages Actions for Breach of the Competition 
Rules, (2014) 51 CMLR, 1342.  
50 I. Lianos, Causal Uncertainty and Damages Claims for the Infringement of Competition Law in Europe, 1 
Yearbook of European Law, (2015), 50.  
51 F.G. Wilman, The End of the Absence? The Growing Body of EU Legislation on Private Enforcement and the 
Main Remedies It Provides For, (2016) 53 CMLR, 902.  
52 International Competition Network, Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual- Chapter on Relationships between 
Competition Agencies and Public Procurement Bodies, available at: 
http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1036.pdf (accessed 13 July 2018).  
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theories of collusion means that inevitably the private enforcement will be little in the domain 
of public procurement.  Yet, some jurisdictions have gotten off to a good start by enabling their 
national competition authorities to control the competitiveness of public procurement and 
initiate a bid rigging case on their own initiative every time they suspect infringement of 
competition law in the course of a public tender.53 
The same applies to the reversal of the burden of proof on the infringer/defendant, in case it 
invokes as a defence against a claim for damages the fact that the injured party/claimant has 
already reduced its actual loss by passing it on, entirely or partly, to its own purchasers.54 It is 
not usual at all in the context of public procurement to see public authorities selling on the 
goods that they procure and do so for a profit. Again, it is neither common nor usual at all to 
see indirect purchasers in the context of public procurement, namely natural or legal persons 
who acquired from a government department or local authority products or services that were 
the object of bid rigging or derived therefrom.  Thus, the presumption of causality for the benefit 
of indirect purchasers because they “did not themselves make any purchase from the infringer 
(i.e. bid riggers in our case) to prove the scope of that harm”55 does not have practical relevance 
in case of contracting authorities suing cartels for damages in the context of the public 
procurement process. At this point, it would be worth to mention that the passing-on defence is 
not accepted in the USA in line with the Illinois Brick case.56 However, there are some 
exceptions to the exclusion of indirect purchaser claims provided for in US Federal law and 
cost plus pricing57 is one of them.58  
Even the causal presumption for cartels that the new Damages Directive expressly sets in order 
to “remedy the information asymmetry and some of the difficulties associated with quantifying 
antitrust harm, as well as to ensure the effectiveness of claims for damages”,59 is not enough 
for contracting authorities to be incentivised to sue bid riggers for damages. To be more 
specific, according to Article 17 of the new Damages Directive, it shall be presumed that cartel 
                                                          
53 International Competition Network, Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual- Chapter on Relationships between 
Competition Agencies and Public Procurement Bodies, available at: 
http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1036.pdf (accessed 13 July 2018).  
54 Recital 39, Directive 2014/104.  
55 Recital 36 & article 14, para. 2, Directive 2014/104. 
56 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 US 720 (1977).  
57 Cost plus contracts do not specify a price, like in case of a fixed price contract, where the seller receives a lump 
sum payment irrespective of the costs actually incurred, but they reimburse the contract or for costs. This 
reduces the adversarial relationship that may arise between the seller and the buyer, if the completion of the 
contract entails additional work above the originally described and for this reason cost plus contracts are 
generally preferred in the construction industry. For further information please see Patrick Bajari and Steven 
Tadelis Procurement Contracts: Fixed Price vs. Cost Plus available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=156470 (accessed 13 July 2018).  
58 In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2012); Commission, Study on the Passing-On of 
Overcharges- Final Report 2016 available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/KD0216916ENN.pdf (accessed 16 July 2018), pp. 18-20; 
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales (1990)103(7) Harvard Law Review, pp. 
1717-1731.  
59 Recital 42 & article 17, para. 2, Directive 2014/104. 
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infringements cause harm and the infringer shall have the right to rebut that presumption. Yet, 
the existence of an infringement decision does not prove itself the level of harm incurred by the 
overcharge.60 Contracting authorities must still predict the real prices of the supplies or services 
had bid riggers not raised them artificially, by estimating what the winning bids would have 
been but for the collusive agreement (the counterfactual).61 This is something particularly 
demanding and costly, especially in view of the “blanket ban” imposed on the disclosure of 
files and documents submitted by the firm that first blew the whistle on the bid-rigging 
conspiracy62 as well as the difficulty of procurement officers in identifying and comprehending 
the length and nature of deviations from the initial quantity ordered and contracted by the State 
for the reasons discussed in section two. The demonstration and calculation of the cartel 
overcharge by contracting authorities becomes even more difficult in cases in which there is 
need to take into account environmental, social and innovative aspects when assessing a tender 
on the basis of the best price-quality ratio. By procuring in a more quality oriented way, 
contracting authorities are called to determine each time the overcharge not only on the basis 
of price and life-cycle costs but also quality, environmental considerations, social aspects or 
innovation of what is procured. Of course the new Damages Directive contemplates that when 
it is practically impossible or excessively difficult for a claimant precisely to quantify the harm 
suffered on the basis of the evidence available, the national courts shall be empowered to 
estimate the amount of harm.63 However, the calculation of damages is one of the most complex 
issues in private competition law claims. In addition, the damage estimation exercise may be 
rather challenging for contracting authorities for another reason. Bid riggers take great care not 
to get detected and so direct proof of the amount of the overcharge is not usually available in 
the context of public procurement.64 This is compounded by the fact that the application of the 
leniency programme for the detection of bid rigging in public procurement is not widespread, 
in contrast to normal cartels that the leniency applicants are the most frequent source of 
information.65 As a consequence, the difficulty, time and administrative cost of collecting 
intelligence and evidence of cartel infringements still remains in public procurement, whilst the 
leniency programme could have been a significant help for public officers. The first reason for 
                                                          
60 A. Stephan, The EU Damages Directive in Geradin, Stephan and  Argenton (eds) EU Cartel Law and Economics 
(Oxford University Press, 2018) forthcoming.   
61 J.H. Howard and D. Kaserman, Proof of Damages in Construction Industry Bid-Rigging Cases, (1989) 34 Antitrust 
Bull., 363-364; S. Bishop and M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and 
Measurement (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2010), Chapter 17. 
62 Art. 6, para. 6, Directive 2014/104; J. Kwan-Terry, The Damages Directive: end of England’s eminence? (2015) 
36 ECLR,459.  
63 Art 17, para 1, Directive 2014/104. 
64 J.H. Howard and D. Kaserman, Proof of Damages in Construction Industry Bid-Rigging Cases, (1989) 34 Antitrust 
Bull., 363-364; S. Bishop and M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and 
Measurement (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2010), pp. 363-364.  
65 A. Heimler, Cartels in Public Procurement (2012)8(4) Journal of Competition Law & Economics, p. 857. See also 
W. P.J. Wils, The Use of Leniency in EU Cartel Enforcement: An Assessment after Twenty Years (2016) 39(3) World 
Competition, pp. 327-388. 
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this is  the great stability of cartels in public procurement markets. It is a disincentive for 
colluding firms to report the existence of a bidding ring when it does not seem to break up 
soon.66 The second reason relates to the fact that many cartels are usually reported in the context 
of a merger between two firms, as soon as the acquiring firm discovers the anticompetitive 
conduct of the acquired firm. In case of public procurement though, the size of bid rigging 
companies is usually small and so a merger between them does not fall under the turnover 
threshold to trigger a merger notification under the EU law.67    Moreover, the reputational 
damage that can be politically adverse in the next procurement process is another disincentive 
for firms involved in a bidding ring, when it comes to apply for leniency.68 The ineffectiveness 
of leniency policies when it comes to bid rigging has also been empirically proved by an 
experimental study that took place in a repeated procurement auction game.69 But even if direct 
proof of the overcharge amount is available, it will probably be an “understated measure of 
damage”.70 
Further, there may be difficulty in deciding which contracts to include in the sample under 
investigation in order to classify them as rigged or unrigged.71 As already explained above, 
when it comes to bid rigging, there is not a typical illegal behaviour that gives an indication of 
which undertakings were participants in the bidding ring and which undertakings were 
outsiders, thus enabling contracting authorities to collect evidence and make the relevant 
classifications. This is particularly true in case of industries where there has been evidence of 
“endemic” bid rigging in respect of thousands of tenders, such as the construction sector in 
England and Scotland, in which, according to one study, 112 companies were found to be 
engaged in bid rigging.72 If this problem is not properly addressed, the statistical analysis of 
                                                          
66 A. Heimler, Cartels in Public Procurement (2012)8(4) Journal of Competition Law & Economics, p. 859. 
67 A. Heimler, Cartels in Public Procurement (2012)8(4) Journal of Competition Law & Economics, p. 859. 
68 A. Heimler, Cartels in Public Procurement (2012) JCLE, 10-12; ICN, Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual: 
Relationships between Competition Agencies and Public Procurement Bodies, April 2015, available at: 
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1036.pdf (accessed 19 August 2017). 
69 Y. Hamaguchi and T. Kawagoe, An Experimental Study of Procurement Auctions with Leniency Program, CPRC 
Discussion Paper Series CPDP-24-E January 2007, www.jftc.go.jp/cprc/discussionpapers/h18/index.files/CPDP-
24-E.pdf (accessed 12 February 2018); C. Marvāo and G. Spagnolo, What do we know about the Effectiveness of 
Leniency Policies? A Survey of the Empirical and Experimental Evidence in Caron Beaton-Wells and Christopher 
Tran (eds), Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary Age- Leniency Religion (Hart Publishing, 2015), 77-78. 
70 J.H. Howard and D. Kaserman, Proof of Damages in Construction Industry Bid-Rigging Cases, (1989) 34 Antitrust 
Bull., 363-364; S. Bishop and M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and 
Measurement (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2010), pp. 363-364. 
71 J.H. Howard and D. Kaserman, Proof of Damages in Construction Industry Bid-Rigging Cases, (1989) 34 Antitrust 
Bull.,, p. 365.  
72 M. Tournier and J. Pheasant, The UK Construction Industry Under the Spotlight Again, (2008).29 ECLR, 557-559.  
15 
 
damages may be “seriously biased downward”, by indicating lower damages than were actually 
suffered by the victims.73  
An additional problem may be the identification of an adequate control group so that 
comparator-based methods may be used in order to estimate over time on the same market the 
price difference between the real value of the products or services and the artificially raised 
price at which they were purchased by the contracting authorities.74 This means that a reliable 
statistical evaluation presupposes a sufficient number of unrigged observations in order to 
compare the price in the infringement scenario with a non-infringement scenario.75 However, 
it may be rather difficult to collect data on public contracts awarded before the formation of a 
bidding ring and after its detection, either because of the time that has passed or because the 
damages action was brought so promptly that not many public contracts could be concluded in 
the aftermath.76 Particularly in the domain of public procurement, where the fragmentation of 
the public sector is extremely high, there is an enormous volume of data which is fragmented 
in computerized systems from different contracting authorities. As a result, the collection of 
data on public contracts awarded before the formation and after the detection of a bidding ring 
becomes even more difficult. What is more, as already mentioned in the previous paragraph, in 
industries where bid rigging turns out to be “endemic”, it is rather hard to ensure a sufficient 
number of unrigged observations.    
In addition to the above weaknesses and challenges that the new Directive presents, there is 
empirical research suggesting that there would be no point in promoting private enforcement 
actions involving bidding rings. This is so because of the limited role that private antitrust 
litigation plays in most European jurisdictions regarding the deterrence of anticompetitive 
violations and the compensation of consumers and undertakings suffering from those 
violations.77 Additionally, settlements are prevalent in EU Member States. According to the 
                                                          
73 J.H. Howard and D. Kaserman, Proof of Damages in Construction Industry Bid-Rigging Cases, (1989) 34 
Antitrust Bull.,, p. 365.  
74 J.H. Howard and D. Kaserman, Proof of Damages in Construction Industry Bid-Rigging Cases, (1989) 34 
Antitrust Bull.,, pp. 365-366.  
75 Commission, Practical Guide Quantifying Harm in Actions For Damages Based on Breaches of Article 101 or 102 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, SWD (2013) 205, available at: 
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76 J.H. Howard and D. Kaserman, Proof of Damages in Construction Industry Bid-Rigging Cases, (1989) 34 Antitrust 
Bull., pp. 365-366. 
77 According to the Ashurst study that took place in 2014, almost 104 damages actions were identified for the 
whole of the European Union. Another report which was prepared for the European Commission found only 96 
antitrust damages actions between May 2004 and the third quarter of 2007. From these antitrust actions, 61 
concerned horizontal agreements, concerted practices or naked cartels (12 on hardcore cartels or concerted 
practices, 1 on horizontal agreements); and 22 cases involved abuses of dominance. The aforementioned 
damages actions were observed only in 10 of the 27 Member States. Moreover, research from the Office of Fair 
Trading (“OFT”) in the UK surveyed 202 companies about their views on private actions under competition law. 
Although 45 of them thought that their company had been harmed by a breach of competition law by someone 
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Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) only a few victims of 
antitrust infringement have been indemnified, as from 2006 to 2012 “less than 25 per cent of 
the European Commission’s infringement decisions were followed by damages actions”.78 The 
European Commission clearly stated in paragraph 52 of its Impact Assessment Report on 
damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules that: 
“Out of the 54 final cartel and antitrust prohibition decisions taken by the 
Commission in the period 2006-2012, only 15 were followed by one or more 
follow-on actions for damages in one or more Member States. In total, 52 actions 
for damages were brought in only seven Member States. In the 20 other Member 
States, the Commission is not aware of any follow-on action for damages based on 
a Commission decision”.79   
 
Though it is not clear whether the above statistics include public bodies that sue for bid rigging, 
it is likely that the same applies because settlements are also favoured in the domain of public 
procurement. Public authorities are usually in a strong position to encourage bidders to settle 
claims for damages instead of going to court, as the undertakings know well that they will have 
to bid for future public contracts from the former. At the same time, contracting authorities take 
great care not to spoil cooperative relationships with future partners and so they may be content 
with partial instead of full compensation, since a settlement would be better for them than 
nothing. The overall prevalence of settlement activity in public procurement can also be 
supported by the new Damages Directive, which contemplates in Recital (48) that: “infringers 
and injured parties should be encouraged to agree on compensating for the harm caused by a 
competition law infringement through consensual dispute resolution mechanisms, such as out-
of-court settlements, arbitration, mediation or conciliation”. Thus, “an infringer that pays 
damages through consensual dispute resolution should not be placed in a worse position vis-à-
vis its co-infringers than it would otherwise be without the consensual settlement”.80 Moreover, 
compensation paid as a result of consensual settlement and prior to the imposition of a fine, 
may be a mitigating factor taken into account by the relevant competition authority.81 
                                                          
else, only five companies finally decided to bring an action because the expected costs would outweigh the 
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competition-law-consultation.pdf (accessed 12 February 2018). 
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80 Rec. 51, Dir 2014/104. 
81 Art 18, para 3, Dir 2014/104.  
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It must be acknowledged that the new Damages Directive did not have as one of its express 
objectives the improvement of contracting authorities’ ability to bring damages actions in the 
context of public procurement. However, in view of the above discussion and analysis, it could 
be said that, whilst public procurement authorities can bring damages actions, the new Damages 
Directive does not provide a framework for encouraging contracting authorities to use private 
enforcement and for this reason its practical relevance in the area of public procurement seems 
limited. 
Hence, it seems that the new Damages Directive does not provide any advantages over claims 
according to longstanding national tort laws and the general competition law when it comes to 
public authorities in public procurement. This conclusion is also supported by several recent 
empirical surveys which affirm that it would not be appropriate to promote damages claims for 
bid rigging, in view of their limited role in deterring antitrust violations in most European 
jurisdictions and the prevalence of settlement activity. 
4 Recommendations  
In the absence of provisions under the new Directive that may have some practical relevance 
for the contracting authorities in the area of public procurement, it is time to make some 
recommendations that would make it easier for public authorities to seek damages for bid 
rigging. The first recommendation regards the high litigation costs that public authorities 
usually face when claiming damages for bid rigging. A possible suggestion to deal with this 
issue is to form a ‘Competition Damages Litigation Fund’, i.e. a supply of money collected 
from contracting authorities, with the aim to use it for covering the competition damages 
litigation costs. A ‘Competition Damages Litigation Fund’ would permit the collection and 
saving of money for this specific reason, every time the national courts of a particular EU 
Member State award damages to the relevant contracting authorities for the anticompetitive 
activities of economic operators in the context of public procurement. Though it could be 
counter-argued that it is sufficient for every contracting authority to collect its own damages 
awarded by the national courts, without having to establish a separate “Competition Damages 
Litigation Fund”, a single account for competition damages litigation is an essential tool for 
consolidating and managing procurement entities’ cash resources. In EU Member States with 
highly-fragmented public sector the establishment of a “Competition Damages Litigation 
Fund” would enable aggregate and efficient control and monitoring of the damages awarded to 
various contracting authorities, while it would prevent idle balances maintained in several bank 
accounts. At the same time, it would facilitate reconciliation between banking and accounting 
data and it would prove that as a matter of fact damages claims for bid rigging in public 
procurement is a priority in the public agenda. The management of this fund could be left to the 
Auditor General of every EU Member State,, who will be in charge of calculating and paying 
the arising litigation costs as well as of informing regularly the contracting authorities about the 
balance of the account. Something similar already happens in the UK, where it is the 
Accountant General of the Senior Courts responsible for the control of the money paid into 
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courts.82 Additionally, in the UK there is a Court Funds Office which provides banking and 
investment services by accounting for any money being paid into and out of court and by 
looking after any investments made with that money.83   Similarly, when the residual funds of 
the “Competition Damages Litigation Fund” are beyond a specific and predetermined amount 
of money at the end of each year, the Auditor General of every EU Member State may distribute 
them pro rata to the involved contracting authorities in order to apply them for their indirect 
benefit, such as purchase of new furniture for their premises, organization and conduct of a new 
procurement process etc. The fact that part of this money may remain in the administration will 
also be an extra incentive for public officers to become more interested in discovering bidding 
rings and in claiming damages for bid rigging. Another recommendation could also be to restrict 
the compensation of the defendant’s fees to the statutory attorney fees in order to prevent 
situations of abuse on behalf of the defendants. Germany is an illustrative example of this, 
despite the ‘loser pays’ rule that applies there.84 
Regarding the concern of contracting authorities that the initiation of litigation against colluding 
economic operators may spoil their cooperative relationship, the author would suggest the 
assignment of their claims to a third party that would also have an interest in bringing an action. 
It has been suggested that special courts/ institutions, like audit agencies, procurement oversight 
agencies, like the National Anti-Corruption Authority of Italy, as well as private agents, like 
law firms and taxpayer associations could be identified as having a proper incentive’ to sue as 
a third party.85 This is something that already takes place in Germany, where claimants can 
assign their claim to third party funders or special purpose vehicles (SPVs).86 In the above list 
of third parties with a proper incentive to sue, the competitors of the bid riggers that were not 
selected for the award of the public contract due to the manipulation of the bidding process 
could also be included.  
As far as the contracting authorities’ difficulty in specifying and quantifying the financial harm 
is concerned, the introduction of statutory or pre-established damages might be a good solution 
to the problem. Specifically it is suggested that contracting authorities before the final judgment 
should have the option to ask for the recovery of statutory/ pre-established damages instead of 
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actual damages, namely a lump sum calculated by the national courts on the basis of pre-
determined factors. These factors could mutually be agreed by the litigants before the initiation 
of the legal proceedings and they could indicatively be the tenders submitted by “maverick 
bidders”, i.e. firms that have demonstrated aggressivity in the past, an aggressive reserve price 
or at least the cost of the entire procurement process, “from the identification of procurement 
opportunities, through the preparation of relevant documentation (an invitation to tender / offer) 
and the conduct of the whole procurement procedure, to provision for possible complaints and 
litigation”.87 Such an evidence-facilitating device already applies in the domain of intellectual 
property, where judicial authorities are enabled “in appropriate cases” to set ‘the damages as a 
lump sum on the basis of elements such as at least the amount of royalties or fees which would 
have been due if the infringer had requested authorization to use the intellectual property right 
in question’.88 Similarly, statutory damages can be found in copyright cases after the enactment 
of the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Act of 1999 and the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1998.89  
5 Alternative Compensatory Remedy  
As we have seen so far based on the analysis above, the new Directive has not managed to solve 
a number of problems. In the previous section, we made some recommendations that would 
possibly deal with some of these issues, primarily the costs and secondarily the quantification 
of the antitrust harm. However, some issues still remain unresolved. For this reason, in the 
further alternative it would be worth exploring whether a remedy which is not based on tortious 
liability but on contractual principles could help contracting authorities to receive compensation 
and overcome the problems of proof and evidence discussed so far, such as the evidence of a 
causal link and the quantification of antitrust harm. In this section, it is recommended that a 
compensatory remedy alternative to standard tort law litigation should be adopted, based on the 
experience gained in Germany and the United Kingdom.  
 
5.1 Liquidated Damages Clauses 
The contracting parties are able to agree upon “liquidated damages” or “lump sum damage” 
provisions, meaning “an amount of compensation payable in the event of breach of the contract, 
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or one of its terms”.90 Liquidated damages clauses in public contracts are particularly attractive 
because as soon as one breach occurs (in our own case we are particularly interested in any 
infringement of competition law in the context of public procurement), the claimant, i.e. public 
bodies, are free from the expense and burden of proving their loss and enforce their claims.91  
Germany is an illustrative example of an EU Member State where liquidated damages are quite 
widespread in standard purchasing terms and conditions and their use is becoming even greater, 
by stipulating that in case of a (proven) cartel infringement by the seller, the latter will have to 
pay a lump sum damage to the purchaser.92 There are several court judgments in Germany that 
have ruled on the validity of liquidated damages clauses.93 All of them awarded the claimed 
damages to public bodies, such as municipalities and public transport companies, and they 
accepted that the liquidated damages clause is legal and enforceable. In particular, it was held 
that:  
“The amount of the lump sum damage of 15 per cent is not beyond the amount 
which can usually be expected in case of a damage caused by a cartel. Therefore 
the buyer can rely on its purchasing terms to claim such a damage amount in the 
first place while the seller then has to prove that there was actually a lower 
damage”.94  
Despite the attractiveness of liquidated damages clauses, still they are not standard in public 
contracts. There are various reasons for this. First and foremost, there is not a consistent 
application of the concept in civil and common law countries. As secondary obligations come 
into play only when the contract is breached, liquidated damages can easily be challenged in 
common law jurisdictions like the UK. They are primarily caught by the “penalty doctrine”, 
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according to which liquidated damages clauses are deemed to be unenforceable penalties if a) 
they are extravagant or unconscionable comparing with the likely damage caused by the breach, 
b) they purport to deter a breach of contract and c) they are not a genuine pre-estimate of loss.95 
The common law on penalty clauses was established a little over 100 years ago. In 2015, the 
UK Supreme Court indicated some progress in this area of law by considering again the law of 
penalties and the validity of penalty clauses. The chance for this reconsideration was given on 
the occasion of the conjoined appeals in Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Talal El Makdessi 
and ParkingEye Ltd v. Beavis.96 It clarified that a clause is not disproportionate to the innocent 
party’s legitimate interests, despite its penal nature when it intends to deter a breach of contract 
and though it may not be representative of the actual loss that the innocent party sustained, as 
long as the clause has been the object of negotiations between contracting parties of comparable 
bargaining power and it has been scrutinized by their legal advisers.97 On the other hand, in 
civil law countries, penalty clauses are allowed, as long as the penalty amount is not manifestly 
excessive.98 In these countries, traditionally there used to be no distinction between liquidated 
damages and penalty clauses, but following the precedent of the German Civil Code, there is a 
distinction between them and they also provide for mitigation of penalty clauses if they are 
“disproportionate or excessively high/manifestly excessive”99.   
To make things worse, the lack of uniform application of liquidated damages clauses can be 
found even in the context of a single EU Member State and jurisdiction. In Germany, for 
instance, there are several uncertainties regarding liquidated damages clauses. There is still no 
consensus regarding the validity of contractual clauses providing for a lump sum as 
compensation in case of competition law infringements. In its judgment on 13 April 2016, the 
regional court of Potsdam100 held that purchasing terms contemplating a lump-sum amount of 
damages amounting to 15 per cent of the contract value in all cases, regardless of the specific 
type and intensity of the competition law infringement that took place, are too wide in scope 
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and so they fail to fulfill the standard of damages expected under normal circumstances.101 This 
judgment was further appealed to the Federal Supreme Court but the appeal was withdrawn, 
leaving many questions unanswered.102  
Another reason why liquidated damages clauses are not standard in a public contract is that they 
limit the damages to which the claimant is entitled and that the contract enforcement rate is 
generally low. Contract law matters a lot less than expected, as non-contractual enforcement 
mechanisms such as reputation and loss of future revenue can play a really important role for 
contracting parties.103 This can be explained by the fact that contracting parties generally avoid 
courts in order to enforce contractual obligations, for fear that they will pay a lot of money for 
legal fees, while in the end the case may not be resolved in their favour, “despite the significant 
attention paid to drafting, amending and consulting formal contracts”.104 Under these 
circumstances, “litigation is almost always an empty threat”.105  
In addition to the above, as regards public contracts in particular, corruption of the civil servants 
who are in charge of the contract as well as the negative effects of litigation on the continuation 
of the buyer-supplier relationship may prevent the effective enforcement of contractual 
remedies, such as liquidated damages clauses, in the domain of public procurement.106 As HM 
Treasury characteristically mentioned in one of its reports about Private Finance Initiatives 
(PFIs)107 “there exists anecdotal evidence that the public sector can sometimes be reluctant to 
levy deductions for fear of spoiling the relationship with the private sector”.108 In Italy, 
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according to third party inspections commissioned by the Italian Public Procurement Agency 
(Consip.), “in the period 2005-2008 on a total of 4095 inspections a total of 1455 contractual 
infringements by the contractor were ascertained, but contractual remedies/penalties were only 
exercised in 64 of those cases, i.e. against about 4.42 per cent of the infringements”109.   
In view of the above liquidated damages clauses could be  a good alternative remedy that would 
help contracting authorities to receive compensation and overcome the problems of proof and 
evidence that they currently face under the new Damages Directive,  as long as there was   a 
uniform approach regarding the extent of their validity. Otherwise there is always the risk that 
liquidated damage clauses remain unapplied and may be rejected by the court.  
6 Conclusions 
Competitive tender processes in public procurement contribute to greater economic efficiency 
and particularly to lower prices for the award of public contracts, saving money for the taxpayer. 
However, bid rigging, an anticompetitive activity  that is widespread in public procurement 
markets, may artificially raise the prices of goods or services procured, placing an unnecessary 
burden on public finances as well as on taxpayers that ultimately pay for them. For this reason, 
the possibility for deceived contracting authorities to seek damages for the rigged goods or 
services for which they have overpaid is of great significance, especially in a time of economic 
crisis in which attempts are made to reduce public expenditure and secure budget savings.  
Before the new Damages Directive, the major problems that victims of competition law 
infringements usually experienced when asking for compensation were the difficulty of access 
to the evidence that was necessary for proving a case, the lack of clear rules on the passing-on 
defence, the calculation of damages and the rules concerning the costs of a damages action. The 
Directive sought to overcome these issues by introducing a number of key provisions. This 
paper investigated whether these key provisions adopted by the new Damages Directive were 
able to overcome the hurdles that contracting authorities usually face when seeking damages 
for bid rigging. The paper has demonstrated a number of respects in which the new Damages 
Directive has failed to put contracting authorities in a particularly good position to recover 
damages for bid rigging. Though the new Damages Directive has several strong points, such as 
the harmonization of evidential presumptions and procedural requirements, the explicit rule of 
joint and several liability in case of multiple tortfeasors as well as a series of provisions that 
facilitate the evidence of causal link, practically speaking, these steps are not adequate to boost 
the number of damage actions initiated by public contracting authorities. This may be done only 
if attempts are made to deal with the main reasons why contracting authorities are discouraged 
from lodging actions for damages against bid riggers.  
After identifying the challenges that arise for public authorities in bringing damages claims for 
bid rigging under the new Damages Directive, some recommendations were made to address 
the problem of high litigation costs, the concern that the initiation of litigation may spoil the 
buyer-supplier relationship and the difficulty in specifying and quantifying the antitrust harm 
                                                          
109 E. Iossa and G. Spagnolo, Contracts as Threats: On a Rationale for Rewarding A while Hoping for B, (2011) 
CEPR Discussion Papers No. 8195, fn 1.  
24 
 
suffered by contracting authorities. This paper has argued that a “Competition Damages 
Litigation Fund” is needed, which would enable the collection and saving of money with the 
aim that the deceived contracting authorities may seek damages for the rigged goods or services 
overpaid. The restriction on compensation of the defendant’s fees to the statutory attorney fees 
was an extra proposal for curtailing litigation costs. The assignment of public authorities’ 
damages claims to a third party that would also have an interest to sue was another suggestion 
in order to overcome the fear of bad cooperative relationships with suppliers in future. Finally, 
the paper argued that the introduction of statutory or pre-established damages, meaning a lump 
sum calculated on the basis of pre-determined factors, is a good option for contracting 
authorities to overcome the difficulty in specifying and quantifying the financial harm. 
In the further alternative, the paper investigated whether an alternative remedy to classic tort 
law litigation could enable contracting authorities to get compensated more easily in respect of 
proof and evidence. The paper distinguished liquidated damages clauses as a good alternative 
based on contractual principles because public bodies are free from the expense and burden of 
proving their loss and enforcing their claims.  Nonetheless, until there is a uniform approach 
regarding their validity, there is always the risk of remaining unapplied and being rejected by 
the court.  
In view of the above analysis, the development of damages claims brought by public authorities 
should be seen as an adjunct to the current state of antitrust enforcement in the EU for the 
reasons explained in the introduction of the paper. Even if the European legislator put its best 
foot forward and tried to deal with several procedural problems in private enforcement, it felt 
reluctant to carry it through. The new Damages Directive does not seem to be effective enough 
for the legal reparation of contracting authorities as private litigants. Before its enactment, 
procurement entities were still able to get compensation by means of private actions under the 
relevant national tort laws, even in the shadow of the obstacles identified above. As a result, 
private enforcement in the domain of public procurement currently operates in the slow lane 
and so the author believes that until the Commission reviews the new Damages Directive, 
submits its report and suggests more amendments that would further encourage public 
authorities to sue bidding rings for damages, settlements should probably be preferred in the 
domain of public procurement. The solutions given in the section of Recommendations, as well 
as the alternative compensatory remedy suggested in the paper could be a good starting point 
for the future changes that need to be made. 
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• Please clarify certain competition law terms for the benefit of those procurement 
lawyers that may not be familiar with EU competition law i.e. “bid rigging”, “vertical 
restraints”, “direct and indirect purchasers” and “passing on defence”. 
• Some of the difficulties you identify for claimants in establishing damages claims are 
not unique to contracting authorities but are faced by all claimants generally e.g. 
resources to conduct investigations, proof (causation, extent of loss etc), prejudicing 
future business relations etc. You may wish to consider whether there are other specific 
issues facing contracting authorities.  
• You may wish to consider whether your recommendations could be improved by 
exploring whether the potential counterarguments/disadvantages of your 
recommendations? You tend to identify all of the positives but none of the negatives. 
For example, is a Competition Damages Litigation Fund really feasible? Are there any 
disadvantages to relying on liquidated damages clauses? 
